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NEW ECONOMICS OF OIL
SPENCER DALE *
Introduction

The oil market has been at the centre of economic news over much
of the past year: what should we make of the US shale revolution;
how will the rebalancing of the Chinese economy affect demand; and
most obviously, what are the implications of the dramatic fall in oil
prices over the past year or so?
The implications of these developments are far reaching. For
policymakers, responding to their impact on the prospects for
demand and inflation; for financial markets, involved in the trading
and financing of oil flows; and most fundamentally of all, for
businesses and families across the world that rely on oil to fuel their
everyday businesses and lives.
As economists, when faced with questions about the oil market
and oil prices, a natural instinct is to revert to the key principles and
beliefs that we think underpin the operation of the oil market.
Coming to the world of energy relatively recently – after spending
more than 25 years in central banking – many of my core beliefs
about the oil market stemmed from what I had learnt at school and
university.
In particular, much of my thinking was based around four core
principles:
* The following paper was presented by Spencer Dale, Chief Economist for BP, at the
Society of Business Economists' Annual Conference, on October 13, 2015, in London. Mr.
Dale manages BP’s global economics team, providing economic input into the firm’s
commercial decisions. BP’s economics team also produces the annual Statistical Review of
World Energy and Global Energy Outlook.
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Oil is an exhaustible resource: it will eventually run out. As such,
as it becomes increasingly scarce, the price of oil is likely to increase
over time relative to the prices of other (inexhaustible) goods and
services. The classic reference here is obviously Hotelling, which
treats oil resources as akin to a financial asset, such that (in the
simplest case) the relative price of oil increases in line with the real
interest rate.
Oil demand and supply curves are steep: i.e. they are very price
inelastic: demand because there are relatively few substitutes for oil,
especially in the short run; and supply because once an oil company
has invested huge sums of money in building an operating platform
and the oil is flowing, the supply from that operation is not sensitive
to fluctuations in the price: you don’t turn the tap off just because the
oil price falls.
Oil flows from east to west: most obviously, oil is produced in the
Middle East and flows to Europe and America. The counterpart is
that money flows in the opposite direction, leading to well-known
issues associated with petrocurrencies and petrodollars.
OPEC stabilises the oil market: for example, in 2008/9 with the
global economy in deep recession, and oil prices plunging from $145
to $35, OPEC cut production by nearly 3 Mb/d helping to stabilise
prices. Similarly, OPEC raised production sharply in 2004 when
global demand suddenly surged.
The individual toolkits that we each reach for when trying to make
sense of the oil market will all be slightly different, with different
elements and different emphases. But my guess is that for many of
us something like these four basic principles feature in them.
If that is the case, we may need to think again.
The oil market has changed very significantly over the last 10 or
15 years. The principles and beliefs that served us well in the past
are no longer as useful for analysing the oil market. We need an
updated set of principles reflecting the New Economics of Oil.
Two changes in particular have had a profound impact on the
economics of the oil market.
The most significant change stems from the US shale revolution:
the rapid growth of on-shore oil production in the US, typically using
hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) techniques to extract oil from shale
and other types of so-called tight rocks.
The second major change is occurring more slowly and arises from
the increasing concerns about carbon emissions and climate change.
Such concerns are, of course, nothing new.
But increasing
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prominence is being given to them, in China and the US as well as
Europe, and momentum for increased action is growing – particularly
this year as the Paris talks approach. If that sense of urgency
translates into policies this could have significant implications for the
long-run demand for all fossil fuels.
Let’s look in more detail at the shale story.
From a near standing start in 2010, US shale oil production has
increased to around 4.5 Mb/d today. Cost structures vary greatly
across different regions and different plays, but most estimates
suggest that the majority of US shale oil lies somewhere broadly in
the middle of the aggregate cost curve (Chart 1).
Chart 1
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Although US shale oil accounts for less than 5% of the global oil
market, the rapid growth in US shale oil was the key factor driving
the collapse in oil prices last year: US oil production on its own
increased by almost twice the expansion in global oil demand.
Moreover, the different production techniques and financing
structures found in the US shale industry have the potential to have a
lasting impact on global oil market dynamics.
The factors and forces driving the oil market today are different to
those of 20 or even 10 years ago. We wouldn’t take a monkey
wrench and an oily rag to the digital engines found in today’s cars.
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Likewise, we need to update our analytical tools to take account of
today’s oil market.
To take account of the New Economics of Oil.
New Economics of Oil

To consider what this might mean, let’s revisit the four basic
principles I outlined and see how they are affected by recent
developments.
Revisiting Principle 1: Oil is an exhaustible resource

The first, most basic, principle was that oil is an exhaustible
resource.
In its simplest form, Hotelling does not allow for the possibility of
new discoveries of oil or for uncertainty as to how much can be
extracted from a particular reservoir. The total stock of recoverable
oil resources is assumed to be known and the main focus is on the
optimal pace at which these resources should be exhausted.
But in practice, estimates of recoverable oil resources are
increasing all the time, as new discoveries are made and technology
and understanding improves. And, importantly, they are increasing
far more quickly than existing reserves are consumed.
In very rough terms, over the past 35 years, the world has
consumed around 1 trillion barrels of oil. Over that same period,
proved reserves of oil have increased by more than 1 trillion barrels.
Put differently, for every barrel of oil consumed, another two have
been added.
Total proved reserves of oil – reserves of oil which, with
reasonable certainty, can be economically recovered from known
reservoirs – are almost two-and-a-half times greater today than in
1980.
Increases in available oil resources are nothing new. But what has
changed in recent years is the growing recognition that concerns
about carbon emissions and climate change mean that it is
increasingly unlikely that the world’s reserves of oil will ever be
exhausted.
Existing reserves of fossil fuels – i.e. oil, gas and coal – if used in
their entirety would generate somewhere in excess of 2.8 trillion
tonnes of CO2, well in excess of the 1 trillion tonnes or so the
scientific community consider is consistent with limiting the rise in
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global mean temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Centigrade. 1
And this takes no account of the new discoveries which are being
made all the time or of the vast resources of fossil fuels not yet
booked as reserves.
There are many caveats and qualifications to this type of simple
calculation.
Most importantly, not all fossil fuels are alike: coal is the highestcarbon fuel and burning current reserves of coal would account for
60% of those emissions. It follows that coal is likely to be more
affected by future climate policies than either oil or gas.
Moreover, emerging technologies, such as Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS), mean that we may be able to find new ways of using
fossil fuels for power generation which significantly reduce
Greenhouse Gas emissions.
But even so, the pace at which estimates of recoverable oil
resources are increasing, together with growing concerns about the
environment, means that it seems unlikely that all of the world’s oil
will be consumed.
How might this change our understanding of the oil market?
Importantly, it suggests that there is no longer a strong reason to
expect the relative price of oil to increase over time. As with other
goods and services, the price of oil will depend on movements in
demand and supply.
From the supply side, it might still be natural to assume that the
relative price of oil will increase over time as it becomes increasingly
difficult (and costly) to extract. The most easily accessible oil is
extracted first, forcing energy companies to dig deeper and deeper in
increasingly difficult environments.
But this increasing difficulty needs to be set against technological
progress. The oil industry, as with any other successful industry, is
continually innovating and implementing new techniques and
processes.
The poster child for these advancements in recent years has been
the US shale industry. The use of increasingly sophisticated drilling
techniques and huge improvements in cost efficiencies has allowed
previously uneconomic resources of oil to be recovered. Productivity
gains within the US shale industry in recent years have been mindboggling. Productivity growth, as measured by initial production per
rig, averaged over 30% per year between 2007 and 2014 (Chart 2).
1. IPCC 2013, Fifth Assessment Report, Summary for Policymakers
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Chart 2
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The recognition that oil resources are probably never likely to be
exhausted puts greater focus on future productivity trends when
assessing the long-term outlook for oil prices. The possible
implications of the US shale revolution are particularly fascinating in
this regard.
The key point here is that the nature of fracking is far more akin to
a standardised, repeated, manufacturing-like process, rather than the
one-off, large-scale engineering projects that characterise many
conventional oil projects. The same rigs are used to drill multiple
wells using the same processes in similar locations. And, as with
many repeated manufacturing processes, fracking is generating
strong productivity gains.
As you know, the strength of manufacturing productivity has led to
a trend decline in the prices of goods relative to services. A
fascinating question raised by fracking – and its manufacturing-type
characteristics – is whether it will have the same impact on the
relative price of oil. A key issue here is whether these types of
repeated, standardised processes can be applied outside of the US and
to more conventional types of production. Can the discipline of lean
manufacturing be applied to conventional oil operations?
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Revisiting Principle 2: Oil demand and supply curves are steep

Turn next to the view that oil supply curves tend to be steep,
leading to large fluctuations in the oil price.
The limited responsiveness of conventional oil supply to price
movements stems from the significant time lag between investment
decisions and production. It can often take several years or more
from the decision to invest in a particular field before it starts to
produce oil, and once the oil is flowing, it will often last for many
years.
Shale oil (and fracking) completely changes this in two important
respects.
First, the nature of the operation in which the same rigs and the
same processes are used to drill many wells in similar locations
means the time between a decision to drill a new well and oil being
produced can be measured in weeks rather than years.
Second, the life of a shale oil well tends to be far shorter than that
for a conventional well: its decline rate is far steeper. Chart 3
compares production data taken from a typical US shale well, in this
case in the Bakken in North Dakota, with that from a Deepwater well
in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). Daily production from the shale well
declined by around 75% in its first year of production – a really steep
rate of decline. The corresponding rate of decline for the GOM well
was far slower.
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These two characteristics – short production lags and high decline
rates – mean there is a far closer correspondence between investment
and production of shale oil. Investment decisions impact production
far more quickly. And production levels fall off far more quickly
unless investment in maintained.
An important consequence of these characteristics is that the shortrun responsiveness of shale oil to price changes will be far greater
than that for conventional oil. As prices fall, investment and drilling
activity will decline and production will soon follow. But as prices
recover, investment and production can be increased relatively
quickly.
The US shale revolution has, in effect, introduced a kink in the
(short-run) oil supply curve, which should act to dampen price
volatility. As prices fall, the supply of shale oil will decline,
mitigating the fall in oil prices. Likewise, as prices recover, shale oil
will increase, limiting any spike in oil prices.
Shale oil acts as a form of shock absorber for the global oil market.
It is important to be clear exactly why shale oil is likely to play this
role.
The short lead time between investment decisions and production
means output can adjust relatively quickly.
Equally important, the very high rates of decline of shale wells
mean that operating costs in the shale industry – i.e. the variable cost
associated with producing a barrel of oil – are a relatively high ratio
of total costs. The high decline rates mean, in effect, that shale
operations have relatively low fixed costs. This high ratio of variable
costs to total costs increases the short-run responsiveness of shale oil.
In contrast, more conventional operations tend to have a significant
fixed investment component, for example, in the form of operating
platforms, pipelines etc. These sunk costs mean that the variable cost
of producing an extra barrel of oil is materially lower than the total
(all in) cost, dampening the responsiveness of conventional supply in
the short run.
To be clear: shale oil is the marginal source of supply only in a
temporal sense. The majority of shale oil lies somewhere in the
middle of the cost curve. As such, further out, as other types of
production have time to adjust and oil companies have to take
account of the cost of investing in new drilling rigs and operating
platforms, the burden of adjustment is likely to shift gradually away
from shale oil towards other forms of production, further up the cost
curve.
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There is one other interesting point to note when considering the
supply of shale oil.
Although its production characteristics should dampen price
volatility, the financial characteristics of the independent producers
operating in US shale may introduce an additional source of
volatility.
Conventional oil supply is dominated by large national oil
companies and, to a lesser extent, large international oil companies,
such as BP. These companies are very big, with global footprints,
producing huge quantities of oil every day. They have relatively low
levels of gearing, significant cash reserves, and an operating model
which, in most times, ensures that the cash generated by the business
is more than sufficient to cover capital expenditures.
In contrast, the financial structures of even the largest independent
producers operating within the US shale are far less robust. The
scale of activity is considerably smaller. Typical gearing levels are
far higher. And, importantly, the vast majority of independent
producers have negative cash flows; that is, they don’t generate
sufficient cash from their operations to fund future investments. As
such, they are dependent on a continual supply of external finance in
order to invest and produce.
In macroeconomic speak, US shale has introduced a credit channel
to the oil market. And we all know from the misery of the financial
crisis how destabilising credit and banking flows can be in
transmitting and amplifying shocks. Until now, the financial
resources of the national oil companies and the large supermajors
mean that the oil market has been largely insulated from the vagaries
of the banking system. But the small, heavily-indebted, independent
producers that characterise the shale industry change all that.
It seems quite likely that the scale of funding that enabled the US
shale revolution to expand at the pace it did over the past 4 or 5 years
would not have been available had global interest rates not been close
to zero, with central banks using large-scale quantitative easing to
encourage investors to invest in riskier forms of assets.
Likewise, with the balance sheets of many shale producers now
severely weakened by low oil prices, a key factor determining the
supply of shale oil over the next few years will be the willingness of
banks and creditors to continue to fund these businesses, especially
as global interest rates begin to rise.
The emergence of US shale oil has altered the nature of global oil
supply. The production characteristics of shale oil should increase
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the price responsiveness of supply, dampening price volatility. But
the greater exposure of shale producers to the financial system means
the oil market is more exposed to financial shocks.
Revisiting Principle 3: Oil flows from East to West

Consider next the presumption that oil predominantly flows from
east to west. Most obviously from the Middle East to Europe and the
US.
This traditional pattern of trade is also changing, reflecting
developments in both the west and the east.
In terms of the west, two developments are important.
First, the demand for oil in the west is falling. Oil consumption in
the US and Europe peaked about 10 years ago and has been on a
downward trend ever since. This largely reflects the improving
efficiency of motor vehicles, with fuel economy of new cars in the
US, measured in terms of miles per gallon, around 20% higher than
10 years ago. And if anything, tightening regulation and improving
technology mean that the pace of efficiency gains is likely to quicken
over the next 20 years. In BP’s Energy Outlook 2035, which looks at
energy trends over the next 20 years or so, the EU’s consumption of
oil in 2035 is projected to be back down to levels last seen in the late
60s, even though EU GDP would have almost quadrupled over the
same period.
The second factor is the huge growth in the supply of energy in the
west, particularly North America. Over the past 5 years, the US on
its own has accounted for almost two-thirds of the increase in the
global supplies of oil and natural gas. Added to that is the growth of
Canadian oil sands.
North America has become a major force amongst global energy
suppliers.
The impact of these two factors has had a huge impact on the
dependency of the US on energy imports. At its peak in 2005, the
US imported more than 12 Mb/d of oil; comfortably the world’s
largest importer of oil. The growth of shale oil has changed all that.
US import demand has more than halved over the past 8 years, and
the US was overtaken by China as the world’s largest net oil importer
in 2013.
Looking ahead, we expect the US to become self-sufficient in
energy by the early 2020s and in oil by the early 2030s (Chart 4). If
anyone, 10 or even 5 years ago had suggested that the US would be
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self-sufficient in energy in their life time they would have been
laughed at. The US shale revolution has changed all that.
In contrast, the fast growing economies of the Far East,
particularly China and India, are becoming increasing dependent on
imported energy. As their economies grow, and the prosperous
middle-classes balloon, China and India are likely to account for
around 60% of the global increase in oil demand over the next 20
years. 2 This increase in oil demand will far outstrip local supplies,
such that by 2035, China looks set to import around three-quarters of
the oil it consumes and India almost 90%.
Chart 4
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This changing pattern of energy flows has a number of potentially
important implications.
The most obvious are for the sources of demand that are likely to
drive energy markets over the coming years. The answer – as is the
case for so many questions these days – is to look east.
Next are implications for financial flows: as energy increasingly
flows from west to east, the funds to pay for that energy will travel in
the opposite direction. This has potentially far-reaching implications
for our understanding of financial risks and asset prices.

2. BP Energy Outlook 2035
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The US current account deficit, along with China’s current account
surplus, was a key part of the so-called global imbalances that
foreshadowed the global financial crisis.
Energy imports were a big part of this imbalance, accounting for
almost half of the US current account deficit of 6% in 2007. That
energy deficiency has now reduced to around 1% of GDP, with the
US set to move to energy self-sufficiency by the early 2020s.
A key element in the global imbalances has completely changed.
In a similar vein, this reduction in the US energy deficit is also
likely to have contributed to the appreciation of the dollar in recent
years. Much of the discussion of the dollar’s appreciation has
focussed on cyclical factors: the relative strength of US demand
growth and its implications for the timing of interest rate hikes. But
it is also important to recognise the important structural changes that
have taken place as the US reliance on energy imports has been
transformed.
As well as energy and financial implications, the changing pattern
of energy flows also has potentially important geo-political
implications.
It is inconceivable that the reduced dependency of the US on oil
imports won’t affect its relationship with some of the key oil
producers.
Perhaps even more importantly, China’s increasing reliance on
energy imports to fuel its future growth – and the associated concerns
this brings about energy security – is likely to have an increasing
influence on China’s foreign relations. Indeed, it seems likely that
the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) –
and the associated “one belt, one road” policy which has been a
centre piece of President Xi Jingping’s first term – stems in no small
measure from these energy security concerns.
The pattern of energy flows is changing, with energy increasingly
flowing from west to east, with far reaching implications for energy
markets, financial markets, and geo-politics.
Revisiting Principle 4: OPEC stabilises the oil market

Consider finally the fourth belief I mentioned: that OPEC acts to
stabilise the oil market.
Many commentators have interpreted recent developments as
suggesting that the role of OPEC has changed. That OPEC has given
up its role as swing producer to shale oil. Or that, rather than
stabilising the market, OPEC has waged war on US shale.
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I don’t think either of these suggestions are correct. Indeed, in
contrast to everything else we have discussed, I would argue that the
role of OPEC has not fundamentally changed relative to the past 20
or 30 years.
Rather, the belief that OPEC would always stabilise the market
was never correct.
The power of OPEC to stabilise the market stems from its ability
to vary supply inter-temporally: to increase or decrease supply from
one period to another in response to shocks or fluctuations.
As such, OPEC has considerable power to stabilise the market in
response to temporary shocks, to either demand or supply.
In terms of demand shocks, in 2008/9 at the height of the great
recession, as oil prices plunged from $145 to $35, OPEC reduced
supply by nearly 3 Mb/d, stabilising the market and boosting prices.
Similarly in 1999, as the Asian financial crisis was hitting demand,
OPEC reduced supply in order to support market prices.
And on the supply side, as the Arab Spring caused significant
supply disruptions in several oil producers in the Middle-East and
North Africa, other OPEC producers – most notably the main GCC
states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE – increased their supply to
offset partially these disruptions.
The ability of OPEC to respond to temporary shocks in order to
stabilise the market has not changed.
OPEC still accounts for
around 40% of crude oil production – close to its average over the
past 40 years. Many of the key producers still have the ability to
control directly their levels of production. And Saudi Arabia has the
only significant margin of spare capacity.
But OPEC has never had the ability to stabilise the market in
response to structural shocks, at least not in a sustainable way.
Suppose, just for a moment, that in 2008/9 there hadn’t been a
severe global recession, but instead a mass-produced electric car had
been invented overnight and had replaced our existing car fleet. The
impact on the oil market would have been similar in that the demand
for oil would have contracted sharply and oil prices would have
fallen.
But the ability of OPEC to do anything about it would have been
very limited.
Yes: OPEC could cut its production; but only at the expense of
giving up its share of an already contracting market to higher-cost
producers. And to maintain prices, it would have needed to give up

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

378

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 1

progressive amounts of market share in subsequent years as the
number of electric cars increased. This is not a sustainable response.
The key point is that, unlike the global recession where demand
was expected to recover at some point in the future, my hypothetical
example of a mass-produced electric car is a persistent shock. The
economically sensible response to such persistent shocks is for OPEC
to maintain its market share and let other higher-cost producers, less
able to compete, bear the brunt of the demand contraction.
We haven’t yet seen the invention of the mass-produced electric
car. But the emergence of US shale oil had a similar qualitative
impact on the supply side.
US shale, although more cyclical, is likely to be a persistent source
of supply for many years to come. Much of current shale oil
production is situated somewhere in the middle of the cost curve.
And the rapid pace of productivity improvements means that its
competitive position relative to other types of production is
increasing all the time.
OPEC is no more able to wage war on US shale than it could on
the electric car. And it hasn’t. Last year, as oil prices plummeted,
OPEC stated that it would maintain its production target of 30 Mb/d
and it did just that: producing an average of 30.1Mb/d in 2014.
This doesn’t mean that OPEC has ceded its role of swing producer
to shale oil. To repeat: OPEC’s ability to stabilise the market in
response to short-lived, temporary shocks remains largely unaffected.
The greater responsiveness of US shale means that cyclical
movements in shale production should also help to stabilise the
market. But OPEC’s role remains dominant.
But when interpreting OPEC’s likely response to a change in
prices it is important to ask why are prices changing? Is it in
response to a temporary shock or a more persistent factor? A global
recession or the mass deployment of an electric car?
Conclusion

The emergence of shale oil, together with growing concerns about
climate change and the environment, means that the beliefs that many
of us have used in the past to analyse the oil market are out of date.
We need a new toolkit, a new set of principles, to guide our analysis
of the oil market.
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A new set of principles that reflect the New Economics of Oil.

There are others far more able than me to work out exactly what
this means in terms of formal models and frameworks. But my
instinct is that any new framework should include the following four
principles:
Oil is not likely to be exhausted: As such, there shouldn’t be a
presumption that the relative price of oil will necessary increase over
time. A key factor governing the future price of oil is whether the
standardised, repeated, “manufacturing-like” processes characterising
shale production, with the associated rapid gains in productivity,
spread to other types of production.
The supply characteristics of shale oil are different to conventional
oil: shale oil is more responsive to oil prices, which should act to
dampen price volatility. But it is also more dependent on the banking
and financial system, increasing the exposure of the oil market to
financial shocks.
Oil is likely to flow increasing from west to east: with important
implications for energy markets, financial markets, and geo-politics.
OPEC remains a central force in the oil market: but when
analysing its ability to stabilise the market, it is important to consider
the nature of the shock driving the change in oil prices and, in
particular, whether it is a temporary or persistent factor.
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